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RESPECT AND THE MENGZIAN CONCEPTION OF YI 





ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on Meng Zi’s idea of yi (義) as a virtue. In it, I first briefly 
examine two influential interpretations of yi – the “appropriateness” approach that views yi 
as a disposition to do what is fitting in a given situation and the shame-centered approach that 
understands yi as a disposition to avoid what is shameful in the moral life. The first approach 
is too thin to distinguish yi from acting properly in general and the second reading confines 
the definitive feeling involved in yi to a too moralized understanding of shame. Moreover, both 
fail to pay enough attention to the reliance of yi on social norms to receive its content. Through 
textual analysis, I show that in addition to a sense of shame, respect as an attitude of 
prioritizing other persons in the way specified by the relevant norms also serves as an 
important emotional core of yi as a virtue. In the end, I highlight the potential contribution of 
the Mengzian idea of yi to virtue ethics. The two-faceted structure of yi points to a way to 
account for rule-related virtues – virtues that have rule-conformity as a component. Equipped 
with thick descriptions of rule-related virtues, virtue ethics will be in a better position to guide 
actions.  
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This paper examines the virtue of yi (“righteousness”, “justice”, “appropriateness”, 
“rightness”, or “integrity”) 1  in the text of Meng-Zi. 2  I argue that the current 
interpretations of this virtue get only part of the truth and neglect an important feature 
of it: its reliance on a social scheme to receive content. Partly because Meng Zi (孟子) 
is frequently discussed in contrast to Xun Zi (荀子) who emphasizes the rule-following 
aspect of ethical life, his insight about social norms and how they relate to virtue is 
ignored. My account of yi highlights that aspect of his thought. Besides, a set of 
respectful sentiments – sentiments that involve giving priority to the significance  
of others by serving them – plays an important role in the motivational structure of yi.  
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1 Due to the multi-dimensionality of yi, I keep this term untranslated. 
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Backed up by a rich psychological account, Mengzian yi incorporates the normative 
force of social norms without reducing itself to mere rule-abidingness. In the 
conclusion, I suggest one potential contribution of Meng Zi’s account of yi to 
contemporary virtue ethics: it points to a way to conceptualize virtues that have rule-
conformity as a component – which I call “rule-related virtues”. Equipped with full 
analyses of rule-related virtues, virtue ethics can guide actions more easily without 
giving up its central commitment to making moral evaluations in terms of the inner 
state of the agent. I want to emphasize that this paper focuses on Meng Zi; I am open 
to the possibility that other Confucian thinkers understand yi differently.  
 
1. THE PROBLEM OF YI IN THE MENG-ZI 
 
In this section, I identify two influential approaches to understand yi. Both capture part 
of the truth but are vulnerable to interpretative and philosophical problems.  
One common way to interpret yi in traditional commentaries and contemporary 
scholarship is to understand it as “appropriateness (yi 宜)”.3 For example, Roger Ames 
holds that yi “is an achieved sense of appropriateness that enables one to act in a proper 
and fitting manner, given the specifics of a situation” (Ames 2011, 205). Following 
Ames, James Behuniak understands yi as “a social sensibility that enables one to 
behave in a fitting manner” (Benuniak 2005, xxvi). As a characterization of one aspect 
of yi, such claims are unproblematic, but as a full analysis, this account is inadequate 
since it over-expands the scope of the virtue of yi. Think of a case in which a civilian 
thrown into the battlefield escapes out of fear. Suppose that she feels the right amount 
of fear and reacts to it correctly (here, to escape). What she does is appropriate, but the 
virtues shown by her action are prudence, alertness, and self-control (by not being panic) 
instead of yi as Meng Zi understands it. In other words, “appropriateness”, standing 
alone, is too thin to capture what is definitive about yi. To be yi is certainly to be 
responsive to features of the context. But Meng Zi also claims yi to be internal to human 
nature (6A4, 6A5), that is, yi is also a manifestation of some inner quality of the agent.4 
Characterizing the content of yi solely by referring to contextual factors, this account 
overlooks the rich materials about the psychological constitution of a yi person in the 
text.5 
 
3 See Zhu Xi (1933, 28), Jiao Xun (2015, 754), and Cheng (1972, 276).  
4  Behuniak (2015, 38) and Chong (2002, 103-4) argue that Meng Zi refutes the internal-external 
distinction and does not argue for the internality of yi. It is unlikely that Meng Zi’s attitude to this 
distinction is a total rejection, even if he is dissatisfied with Gao Zi’s and Meng Jizi’s way to talk about 
internality and externality. In 6A6 he explicitly says that the virtues are “not welded to us externally 非
由外鑠我也.” 
5 Among the interpreters who understand yi in terms of appropriateness or fittingness, Kwong-loi Shun 
shows a tendency to specify what kind of standards yi actions are supposed to fit. For him, yi “as an 
ethical attribute of a person has to do with a firm commitment to ethical standards” (Shun 1997, 62). I 
think the term “ethical standards” is still too general. All virtues by definition lead to actions that are 
appropriate according to ethical standards. To say that yi is a commitment to acting according to ethical 
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Based on Meng Zi’s claim that “the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning 
of yi,” Bryan Van Norden states that yi “is a disposition to disdain or regard as shameful 
certain character traits and the actions that would be characteristic of them” (Van 
Norden 2007, 270). Van Norden indicates that here the tendency to disdain or to regard 
as shameful should not be understood in the conventional sense; rather, it is a 
disposition to have an unpleasant feeling when one recognizes the character flaws of 
their own or of those with whom they identify and to have appropriate emotional and 
behavioral reactions to this recognition. (Van Norden 2002, 52) This view is challenged 
in less moralized readings offered by interpreters like Jane Geaney (2004) and Seok 
(2017). There is no space to examine the details of their disagreements. But at least two 
lacunae can be found in the moralistic reading. First, not in all instances of shame the 
agent has appropriate emotional or behavioral reactions (3B7, 2A9). Secondly, not all 
instances of shame are triggered by the recognition of character flaws (1A5, 4A8, 2A7).  
In my view, the feeling of shame in the Meng-Zi is no more than shame in general 
– the negative feeling toward oneself after one’s inferiority in some aspect is exposed 
through the attitudes of an other. Such exposure happens when the agent perceives a 
discrepancy between her self-regard and an other’s evaluation of her. The “other” can 
be actual or imagined, and the latter paves the way to the development of an 
intrapsychic moral authority. The tendency to feel shame contributes to the 
demarcation of a moral dimension of life that informs the agent about what is truly base 
and to avoid, but it does not alone constitute the dispositional core of yi. Meng Zi 
insightfully claims shame to be only the “beginning” (duan 端) of yi, not yi itself. Not 
only an unmoralized sense of shame (like the shame over one’s poverty) but also a 
moralized one is inadequate as the motivational core of yi actions. A yi person may 
have a heightened repugnance to the defects in her character, but this sensitivity should 
not be what typically motivates her to act in yi ways. For one thing, insofar as she is a 
yi person already, she should not have numerous enough character defects to trigger 
her yi motives so that she acts frequently in yi ways. For another, in many circumstances, 
the concern about one’s character is the wrong kind of reason to qualify an action as 
virtuous. There seems to be something particularly other-regarding in the virtue of yi 
that goes beyond the concern for one’s own moral status.  
In sum, both approaches discussed above capture only part of what yi consists in: 
the first approach grasps the context-sensitivity of this virtue, but is too thin to 
distinguish this virtue from acting properly in a general way and leaves unsaid the 
characteristic feelings that constitute a yi motive. The second approach specifies what 
mentality this virtue requires, but confines the characteristic feelings of yi to a too 
moralized understanding of shame. As I will argue below, both fail to pay enough 
attention to the reliance of yi on a social scheme as the general regulation of behavior 
to receive its content. In the next section, I will lay out the two faceted-structure of yi 
by examining different usages of the term “yi” in the Meng-Zi. This structure calls for 
a more rigorous analysis of Meng Zi’s moral psychology to identify the dispositional 
 
Insofar as Meng Zi bothers to name different virtues, more needs to be said to distinguish yi from other 
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core of yi, and that can be done by looking into a relatively ignored emotion in the 
Meng-Zi – respect.  
 
2. TWO FACES OF YI IN THE MENG-ZI 
 
One difficulty to fully analyze yi in the Mengzian context is due to the structure of yi. 
On the one hand, yi has an intimate relationship with both the physiopsychological 
factor of qi (2A2) and one’s inborn tendencies to feel, and thus is treated as a disposition. 
On the other hand, yi is involved in the discussion of the social order which determines 
the correct way to conduct a wide range of activities from getting married to taking 
governmental positions.6 In several instances, the latter aspect of yi is so prominent that 
yi is paralleled with the term ritual (li 禮) which relates to a codified norm specifying 
proper behaviors. In the rest of this section, I offer textual evidence to illustrate the two 
aspects of yi, and suggest that yi as a disposition has abiding by norms as a component.7  
 
Yi as A Disposition 
In many places “yi” refers to an aspect of personality. In 4B19, Meng Zi praises Shun’s 
acting out of benevolent and yi intentions instead of simply following the requirements 
of benevolence and yi. That is to say, a truly yi person as Shun is, when acting in a yi 
way, expresses a genuinely yi intention, rather than following rules in the purely 
behavioral sense. In 7B37, Meng Zi says he hates slyness (ning 佞), here apparently a 
vicious disposition, which sometimes is confused with yi. In 4B5, 1A7, and 3B9, yi is 
paralleled with the character trait of benevolence, a virtue rooted in one’s 
compassionate heart. As a quality of one’s personality, yi can be possessed by a person, 
and it brings to the possessor joy (4A27, 6A17) that is not lost together with external 
goods (7A9). Moreover, yi is rooted in the inborn affective capacities of humans, not 
forged upon from outside (6A4, 6A5). 
 
Yi and Norms 
Yi as a disposition is only part of Meng Zi’s usage of the term. There are places where 
yi is closely linked to inherited norms that coordinate relationships. For example, in 
7B2, Meng Zi says that there is no yi war in the Spring and Autumn Annals, because 
the norms of war stipulate a war to be rightfully waged only when a state of a higher 
rank attacks its subordinate, while the wars in the Spring and Autumn Annals were 
waged between states of equal rank. Here yi has nothing to do with the disposition of 
any person. What yi is depends on the widely accepted rules regarding military affairs. 
Not only military operations but also economic arrangements can be yi or not yi. In 
3B8, when asked by a counselor whether he could wait until the next year to tax at the 
proper rate, Meng Zi responds that if one sees the current taxation as not-yi, one should 
not wait until the next year to stop it. In 7A33, he says that “To take something that one 
 
6 This aspect of yi in the Meng-Zi is similar to the primary meaning of yi in the Xunzi analyzed in Hutton 
1996, 2015. 




Comparative Philosophy 11.2 (2020)  ZHANG 
 
144 
is not entitled to is not yi.” Here what yi is depends on the norms that regulate the 
distribution of material goods.  
Even in places where yi sounds like a disposition, it is sometimes defined in terms 
of an order that specifies role-specific obligations. In 7A34, Meng Zi first admits that 
the hermit Zhong Zi has limited yi since he would refuse people’s not-yi offering of a 
state. But then he immediately claims Zhong Zi’s yi to be trivial, because “nothing is 
greater for a human than the relations between relatives, ruler, and minister, or 
superiors and inferiors.” By refusing to fulfill his familial duties and the duty of a 
scholar-official, Zhong Zi loses the greater yi. In 3A4, Meng Zi says that it was the 
common yi of the world (tian-xia-zhi-tong-yi 天下之通義) that the people laboring with 
their hearts govern the people laboring with their strength. The “common yi” seems to 
refer to an overarching framework of the division of labor in which the whole human 
community is organized. In 1A3, Meng Zi says that to realize the Kingly Way, the ruler 
should provide education and advocate the yi of filial piety and brotherliness. Here yi 
seems to refer to the norm specifying role-specific duties in familial life.8 In those 
examples, yi relates to a certain norm, order, or model that entails obligations. It has 
less to do with the disposition to feel and to be motivated in a certain way than with 
duty-entailing norms; it is something that can be violated (fan 犯) like punitive laws 
(4A1). 
The norms presumed by yi in the instances cover norms of different kinds: 
economic policy (3B8), norms on military and diplomatic matters (7B2), on property 
(7A33), social order (3A4), and familial duties (1A3). From today’s perspective, those 
norms look so heterogeneous that one may doubt whether yi is simply the state of affairs 
in a well-governed society. Yet I think one feature shared by the norms presumed by 
those instances of yi is that they specify widely recognized role-specific duties backed 
up by established schemes.9 Given that the early Chinese society is permeated by the 
regulation of rituals, to a large extent the norms presumed by yi overlap with rituals. 
Indeed, the binomial term of li-yi (禮義) appears no less frequently than benevolence 
and yi (ren-yi 仁義) in the Meng-Zi (1A7, 7B12, 1B16, passim).10 When asked about 
how his refusal to meet with the various lords is yi, Meng Zi offers examples of ancient 
worthy people refusing to meet certain lords because they were not ministers. The 
 
8 The text is 謹庠序之教，申之以孝悌之義。The yi here can also mean “meaning”, but unlikely so, 
since it should not be a problem for a competent user of the Chinese language at that time to identify 
what the terms “filial piety” and “brotherliness” mean. What needs to be taught or advocated are the 
obligations entailed by filial piety and brotherliness. 
9 I want to emphasize that “established schemes” are indispensable. It is tempting to think that a person's 
place in a relationship alone determines her duty in that relationship. But in most cases, it is not the 
relationship per se, but the socially recognized (sometimes legally sanctioned) norm regulating that 
relationship that determines one’s duty in it. For instance, in many societies, children do not have the 
duty to support their biological mother if the latter is not involved in any way in nurturing them. The 
biological relationship of the woman and the child does not by itself entail a duty.  




Comparative Philosophy 11.2 (2020)  ZHANG 
 
145 
ancient people are yi, because their behavior conforms to the ritual that only ministers 
(instead of commoners) meet the rulers (3B7).11  
 
The Disposition of Yi Having Conformity to Norms as A Component 
From the cases above we can see that some references of “yi” involve norms that 
regulate collective life. Then how does this aspect of yi relate to yi as a disposition? 
One option is to view a person’s being yi or not-yi as totally dependent on whether they 
constantly act according to norms; yi as a disposition is parasitic to norms. 
Yet this understanding of yi encounters two interpretative difficulties. First, it 
cannot explain in what way yi as the propensity to be subject to norms is “internal” to 
human nature as Meng Zi so rigorously argued. In 6A5, he states that external rules 
determine the way in which one’s respect is expressed. Just like the external 
environment (summer or winter) indicates what to drink to quench one’s thirst (cool 
water or hot broth) but the need to drink is from human physicality, norms determine 
the way to express one’s emotion, but there needs to be an emotion to be expressed in 
the first place to qualify an action as virtuous.  
 
11 Meng Zi articulates his thought primarily in terms of virtue and says less about norms of different 
kinds. Regarding the relation between the norms presumed by yi (“yi-norms” below) and ritual norms, I 
have two clarifications:   
  First, I do not take the yi-norms and rituals as norms regulating different spheres of life like legal codes 
and etiquette in our society. A set of yi-norms and a set of ritual norms may regulate the same sphere of 
social life (like in 6A5). They differ in their codifiability and concreteness. Yi-norms are uncodifiable 
and in many circumstances need the codifiable rituals to be carried out. For example, yi requires a 
minister to assist the ruler to govern well. Ritual specifies the concrete manners for a minister to do that: 
how to speak in the court, what style to use in paperwork, how to accept or decline a position, etc. Given 
the penetration of ritual in all relationships in early China, the distinction between yi-norms and ritual is 
more in concept than in practice. The execution of role-specific duties is more often than not regulated 
by ritual. Hence the frequent parallel of li-yi mentioned above. 
   Secondly, it is tempting to say that rituals are conventional codes to be disregarded when more 
important values are in danger (e.g., 4A17), while yi is overriding and should never be compromised 
(e.g., 6A10, see Shun 1997, 57 for this view). However, remarks like 4B6 complicates the issue. 4B6 
says: “a great person will not engage in ‘propriety’ that is not propriety, or ‘yi’ that is not yi 非禮之禮，
非義之義，大人弗為.” By “‘propriety’ that is not propriety”, perhaps Meng Zi means actions that have 
external conformity to ritual codes but are against the value supposed to be protected or expressed by 
those codes (e.g., refusing to touch one's drowning sister-in-law is against the idea of giving due 
treatment, including cherishing her life, to one's sister-in-law). A great person should not do that. If that 
is the case, by “‘yi’ that is not yi”, in a parallel way, Meng Zi means that behaviors that conform to yi-
norms (e.g., a minister defending one’s ruler) may be against the value that the relevant yi-norm is 
supposed to protect or express (e.g., defending the Tyrant Zhou against King Wen is against the value 
that the yi of a minister should promote – good governance). If this reading is correct, 4B6 implies that 
in extreme cases yi-norms can also be overridden.  
  The last point leads to the question of what exactly is the value that undergirds yi-norms. Unfortunately, 
Meng Zi does not have a direct answer. His two versions of the origin story of social order, 3A4 and 
3B9, are both told in very broad strokes and serve more local purposes. There is no space to attend to 
the details of them, but I think one message (though not the central message) conveyed by them is that 
norms are established to promote a peaceful and prosperous livelihood for humans by meeting their 
physical and social needs.  
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Secondly, understanding yi as parasitic to norms ignores the rich materials in the 
Meng-Zi about a cluster of sentiments involved in the disposition of yi – the respectful 
sentiments. Besides 6A5, there are other passages linking yi and respectful 
sentiments.12 In 7A15 Meng Zi says definitively that “revering one’s elders is yi.” 
When specifying the ideal of the five relations, he says “Between ruler and ministers 
there is yi” (3A4) and in 2B2, Jingzi (with whom he agrees on this point) says that 
“ruler and minister emphasize reverence” – the expression of reverence marks the yi 
between ruler and minister. Such frequent parallels suggest that the agent’s feeling 
certain respectful sentiment is characteristic for yi motives. 
Those materials call for a more nuanced account of the mental state that undergirds 
yi motives. Meng Zi uses different terms – respect (gong 恭), reverence (jing 敬), 
esteem (zun 尊), honor (gui 貴), and to follow (cong 從) – to denote the attitudes 
constitutive to yi motives. For my over-arching purpose, I use “respect” as an umbrella 
term to refer to those respectful sentiments. I am not interested in differentiating one’s 
respectful feeling toward one’s elder brother and that toward one’s ruler. Rather, I aim 
to portray what for Meng Zi is the right kind of mentality behind one’s voluntary 
following of social norms. Respect is not the only emotion involved in yi. After 
discussing respect, I will briefly explain the relationship between respect and shame, 
and show how they together constitute the psychological core of yi.  
 
3. YI AND RESPECT IN THE MENG-ZI 
 
Compared with other emotional capacities like the tendencies to feel commiseration 
and shame, the capacity for respect receives relatively less attention. Yet helpful 
discussions exist. Discussing respect and ritual propriety in early Confucianism, Sin-
yee Chan understands respect as “a serious frame of mind” that can have both persons 
and inanimate objects (Heaven, ceremonies, one’s duties) as its object (Chan 2006, 
229). Following Chan, Pengbo Liu proposes what he calls an “inside-out model” to 
understand respect. For him, Confucian respect is “rooted in certain virtuous attitudes 
and dispositions that constitute one’s general way of dealing with the world and one’s 
own place in it. Specifically, these attitudes and dispositions include, but are not limited 
to, seriousness, caution, modesty, etc.” (Liu 2019, 54). I am in line with their reading. 
Yet more needs to be said about respect to distinguish it from other attitudes that also 
involve seriousness, caution, and modesty, such as sincerity (cheng 誠) or awe (wei 畏). 
Furthermore, I think a distinction should be made between respect in Confucius (孔子)’ 
and Xun Zi’s thought and respect in the Meng-Zi: for the former respect sometimes 
have inanimate beings as the object, for the latter respect is almost always toward a 
 
12 It is noteworthy that the sentiments involved in yi are also the paradigmatic feelings associated with 
ritual propriety, but by now this should not surprise us, since we have seen that yi and ritual are 
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person, which can be seen in Chan’s own textual survey (ibid, 232).13 The person-
oriented feature of Mengzian respect is captured by Myeong-seok Kim who 
understands it as “an emotional sensibility responsive to “(1) a person’s worth as a 
person, (2) a person’s worth deriving from his social status or his role in society, and 
(3) a person’s merit due to his ethical or political accomplishment” (Kim 2014, 244). I 
concur with Kim in taking Mengzian respect as a responsive attitude toward other 
persons, but as Liu rightfully observes, in Confucian respect, “no special emphasis is 
given to the inherent properties of persons as such… properties of [respect’s] objects 
are highly relevant to how to appropriately express [respect] in a given context” (Liu 
2019, 54). Following Chan and Liu, I take Mengzian respect as a mental state that 
manifests seriousness and caution but is not dependent on any universally observed 
properties in each individual; following Kim, I take it as person-responsive. My view 
is a synthesis of theirs: precisely because Mengzian respect is person-responsive but 
not responsive to universal properties like rationality, it calls for established norms to 
specify the features of particular persons to respect. In what follows, I argue that the 
definitive content of Mengzian respect is the attitude of prioritizing and serving 
(Section 3.1). Because respect involves the propensity to serve, its expression calls for 
the application of rules so that the proper way to serve can be discerned (Section 3.2). 
 
3.1  RESPECT: A PROPENSITY TO PRIORITIZE BY SERVICE 
 
Meng Zi does not define respect. But the instances of respect in the text show that it 
involves subjecting oneself by prioritizing another person and almost always motivates 
the agent to serve and honor that person.14 In 4A2, he says, “One who does not serve 
one’s ruler in the manner that Shun served Yao does not revere one’s ruler.” In 4A1, 
when explaining the yi in serving a ruler, he says, “To be demanding of one’s ruler is 
what is called being respectful. To display what is good and inhibit what is bad is called 
 
13 The only place where jing refers to a serious frame of mind toward impersonal being is 5A6: “Qi was 
worthy and capable of reverently continuing the Way of Yu 啓賢，能敬承繼禹之道.” But even here 
there is a personal element: what Qi reveres is the way of the eminent person Yu. 
   The distinction between respect for persons and reverence as a general frame of mind is especially 
important because it pertains to a distinction between Mengzian respect and the Neo-Confucian 
reverence anchored in a deep appreciation of principle or pattern (li 理). Stephen Angle argues that Neo-
Confucian reverence consists in “attending single-mindedly to a particular thing or matter before one, in 
all of its distinctness” including “being aware of the interdependence of that thing or matter with its 
entire context” (Angle 2009, 154). In my view, Mengzian respect may be compatible with the 
metaphysical assumptions of Neo-Confucians but does not presume or require them. It is worth exploring 
in a different work how respect for persons relates to facing the cosmos with solemnity.  
14 The purpose of the following two sections is to understand the idea of respect. I will draw on examples 
from passages about both yi and ritual propriety. I do not think this confuses those two virtues. Two 
virtues may share the same mode of feeling as one component of each and differ in other aspects. For 
example, both parental love and friendship involve affectionate care but they differ in aspects such as 
that the former has a level of indulgence and sense of responsibility that the latter lacks. Indeed, it is 
implausible to assume that virtues and feelings have a strict one-to-one relationship. A full examination 
of ritual propriety is beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say here that it does not involve the 
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being reverent.” In those cases, respecting the ruler means serving him by carrying out 
the duties of a minister so that the ruler rules well.  
Respecting one’s family members also involves service. In 5B4 Meng Zi praises 
Shun’s honoring his father (zun-qin 尊親) by serving him: “In being a filial son, nothing 
is greater than honoring one’s relatives. In honoring one’s relatives, nothing is greater 
than caring for them with the world.” In 4A27 and 7A15, he defines yi as “following 
(cong 從) one’s brother” and “revering one’s brother” (7A15) respectively. A sort of 
submission to the elders is exhibited in yi motives. 
It should be noticed that although cong is sometimes translated as “obedience,” the 
submission Meng Zi has in mind is not an absolute one that demands the elimination 
of the agent’s will. Cong’s literal meaning is “to follow” and “to go behind.” It can 
refer to the behavior of obeying someone’s order, but in the Meng-Zi it appears 
frequently in describing people’s attitudes in addition to or even instead of behavior. 
Moreover, cong appears in relationships less antagonistic than the word “obedience” 
implies – one in which a person’s will prevails and the other succumbs. In 6A7 Meng 
Zi assumes that in terms of flavor, all people’s tastes cong the famous chef Yi Ya, 
which cannot mean that they obey Yi Ya regardless of their own will. Rather, people 
appreciate Yi Ya’s taste of cuisine and take his judgment as authoritative. In 2A2 Meng 
Zi says that sages will cong what he says if they arise again.15 In 3A2, quoting the 
Records of Rites he asks people to “cong the ancestors” in mourning and sacrifice. In 
1B15 and 5A6 he uses cong to describe people following the sage king. In 2A8 he 
praises Shun to have “put himself aside and cong others.”16   
A shared aspect of those diverse usages of cong is to accredit significance to 
someone by giving them (and their opinions and claims) priority in consideration. 
Regarding good teachings, one’s attitude is to follow and incorporate them into one’s 
own behavior; regarding good people, to associate with them and recognize their 
authority in practical judgment. If asked, the attitude of cong can be backed up by 
reasons. In the ideal Confucian family, the elder brother is the model whom the younger 
can imitate. The maturity of the elder brother qualifies him as an exemplar for the 
younger. Thus the younger brother, reaching a certain age, would recognize that 
“between elder and younger there is precedence” and prioritize his elder brother in the 
supposedly ritually regulated family life. This does not mean that the younger brother 
can never oppose the elder. Meng Zi’s description of the respectful attitude of the 
younger, as most of his other descriptive and normative sayings, is not a direct 
injunction of action. After all, Meng Zi praises the Duke of Zhou for correcting his 
mistake in trusting his elder brother Guan Shu who revolted (2B9). What gets praised 
 
15 For other places where cong is used as following instructions or an instructor, see 6B14, 7A32, 7A41.  
16 For literal uses of cong, see 1B4 (“To cong the current down and forget to return is what is meant by 
‘drifting.’ To cong the current up and forget to return is what is meant by ‘reversing’.”) and 4A24, 25, 
4B30, 31, 33, 5A2, 6A8, 6A16, 6B6, 7B26. Cong can also mean “to chase” (3A3). The term “cong-zhe
從者”, “people who cong”, can mean “attendant” (3B4) or “follower” in the sense of following another’s 
teaching (7B30). Perhaps not all usages of cong are relevant to Meng Zi's specification of the mentality 
of yi. But by listing such diverse use of the term I want to show that cong is not “obedience” in its most 
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there is the duke’s correcting his mistakes by attacking and punishing Guan Shu. In this 
case, no obedience whatsoever is mentioned. Submission is part of the mentality of 
following, but not in the sense of eliminating one’s will.17 When indicating that yi is to 
cong one’s brother, Meng Zi is illustrating the respectful mentality involved rather than 
defining the behavioral aspect of yi.  
It is tempting to think that respect is necessarily felt by an inferior toward a superior 
in a hierarchical relationship with social rank being the only determinative factor of 
one’s respectability. But the text shows that multiple properties in persons call for 
respect. Meng Zi lists three such properties: “At court, nothing is better than rank. In 
the village, nothing is better than age. In assisting the world and nurturing the people, 
nothing is better than Virtue.” (2B2) In different spheres of social life, different 
standards of respectability apply. Those standards can intersect with each other. In 5B3 
Meng Zi illustrates several cases of the “esteeming the prestigious” (zun-xian 尊賢, 
those of lower rank respecting those of the higher rank due to their status) and 
“respecting the worthy” (gui-gui 貴貴, the high-rank officials respecting the worthy 
due to their competence and virtue) happening simultaneously. 18  The yi in such 
respectful treatments, as Meng Zi says, is “one.” Every society is norm-laden and has 
established rules to regulate relationships. What features are relevant in respecting 
persons and how persons should be respected depend on what such norms say. Hence 
the second feature of Mengzian respect: it requires definite norms to regulate its 
expression. 
 
3.2   RESPECT AS A MOTIVATIONAL SENTIMENT CALLING  
   FOR ACTION IN ACCORD WITH NORMS 
 
In addition to being a “frame of mind” or a mere mood, respect in the Meng-Zi is 
associated with motives to treat others in a certain way. In 7A37, Meng Zi says, “To 
care for someone without respecting him is to treat him like a pet,” and indicates that 
“empty ‘respect’ without actuality (shi 實) cannot ensnare a gentleman.” In the context 
of the Warring States period, “actuality” involves giving gifts appropriate to the status 
of the person according to ritual and offering him governmental positions according to 
his ability (see 5B3). In 5B4 Meng Zi says that when receiving a gift from someone of 
an honorable rank, it is disrespectful to examine whether the giver obtains the gift in a 
yi or not-yi way. As long as the presenting and acceptance of gifts are in accordance 
with ritual, the gift should be received.  
This is surprising considering Meng Zi’s concern about one’s integrity and 
uprightness. Why a careful examination before receiving a gift is disrespectful? If 
something is obtained in a wrong, or even merely questionable way, isn’t it better to 
 
17 Indeed, understanding cong as obedience creates an internal tension in the text. Chen Daqi (2016) 
believes that for Meng Zi cong-xiong means to “obey (聽從，遵從) one’s elder brother”. Understanding 
cong this way, he wonders how, while the core of yi is to obey (one’s elder brother) but the yi toward 
one’s ruler is to rectify, thus not obey, him. (40-1) My interpretation of cong avoids this difficulty. 
18  From this case we can see that respect for Meng Zi is mutual even in the strictly hierarchical 
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refuse it to maintain one’s integrity? Instead of refusal, Meng Zi recommends a mindset 
of deferring and giving priority to others: in normal social interactions, to take oneself 
as entitled with the authority to judge other people’s moral status is disrespectful; it is 
arrogant to put oneself in such imagined authority. Even though he thinks many people 
in his time do get involved in not-yi due to a detrimental social regime, for him, the 
right way to deal with the situation is not to break social rules, but to reform not-yi 
practices while staying within the norm as a larger whole. As he says in 5B9, yi is the 
path and ritual is the door. They provide reliable guidance for people to figure out how 
to express the proper attitude to others. Even Confucius, when reforming the society, 
does not take the risk of abandoning such rules. 
Put into the context in which yi is linked to various norms to express respect, the 
otherwise thin and uninformative aspect of yi – yi as appropriateness – becomes 
illuminating. For Meng Zi, the way to reach that appropriateness is to follow the norms 
that specify role-specific obligations widely accepted by the members in the 
community. In the case of parents, it is caring and supporting; in the case of rulers, 
honest advice; in the case of a scholar-official with whom one associates, exchanging 
gifts in accord with his status. 
Note that Meng Zi’s view should be distinguished from any rule-fetishism that 
takes rules as unconditionally binding. When the other side in a relation refuses to 
regulate her behavior by the socially accepted rules, the agent no longer has the 
obligation to abide by those rules. In 4B3 King Xuan of Qi speaks of the ritual that a 
minister should wear mourning clothes for a deceased ruler, complaining implicitly that 
people no longer do that in his time. Meng Zi responds that if the ruler does not treat 
the minister properly (putting the minister’s admonitions into effect, listening to his 
teachings, assisting his trips, etc.) but on the contrary keeps obstructing the minister’s 
work, the ruler does not deserve to be treated in accordance with ritual. Rules are not 
to be followed unconditionally. 
In sum, Mengzian respect is the tendency to prioritize others in a relationship by 
serving and honoring them according to the norms accepted to regulate their 
relationship. As part of the psychological core of the disposition yi, it is inborn to 
human nature but calls for established rules to provide guidance regarding what specific 
treatment is owed to the respected.  
 
3.3  RESPECT, SHAME, AND YI AS A VIRTUE 
 
The previous account of yi is compatible with pictures of yi drawn based on the other 
feeling that Meng Zi links to yi, shame. Mengzian shame and respect are closely 
connected, if not textually, at least phenomenologically, since both feelings involves 
the sensitivity to the significance of others and the negation of self-assertiveness.19 
Think of what defects of character may be involved in someone who commits not-yi 
by transgressing a norm. Not bothering to take heed of what is required in a relationship, 
they fail to respect the relevant persons in that relationship. They do not take seriously 
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other people’s claims on them – the claims that they should regulate their behavior by 
the shared norms as everyone else in the community. The disrespect shown in the 
nonperformance of one’s duty entails an inadequate sense of shame. By ignoring the 
duty that community members expect them to fulfill, the not-yi person rejects the 
community members’ status as stakeholders entitled to evaluate her, for their 
prospective attitudes, the indignation or disdain that the non-performance of duty 
would incur, do not feature in the not-yi person’s self-evaluation. This is disrespectful 
since it is a symbolic communication that those attitudes do not count. It is at the same 
time shameless, since the not-yi person has an impenetrable self-conception that refuses 
to internalize the negative feelings toward them.  
The connection between respect and shame is due to the structures of both. The 
feeling of shame is by nature intersubjective – feeling shame involves responding to 
the attitudes of others with a self-conception in mind. Such a response presumes some 
significance of others that the agent has to attend to. The feeling of shame has as a part 
of it the recognition of such significance by yielding to other people’s expectations and 
demands, namely, Mengzian respect. Just as the ability to feel shame presumes some 
minimum yielding – some willingness to render oneself susceptible to the attitudes of 
others, the feeling of respect for Meng Zi involves prioritizing the other and thus 
“lowering” oneself.20 In recognizing the significance of others by putting oneself under 
their evaluation, the agent makes herself vulnerable to the potential harm that their 
attitudes can inflict on her self-regard. The capacity to respect is rooted in the sense of 
shame. 
In sum, Mengzian yi as a virtue consists in accrediting significance to other persons 
and responding to such significance by subjecting oneself to them in ways specified by 
the social norms. Yi is preconditioned by a sense of shame as sensitivity to the attitudes 
of others toward oneself and instantiated in voluntarily submitting oneself to the norms 
that specify the due treatment of others and oneself. By showing respect through the 
pertinent norms, a yi person protects her status against disdain. Respect for persons and 
the sense of shame mutually undergird each other and together constitute the 
psychological core of yi. 
 
4. RULE-RELATED VIRTUES  
AND ACTION-GUIDING IN VIRTUE ETHICS 
 
My concern so far is interpretative. To conclude my discussion, I explore the 
significance of the Mengzian account of yi for contemporary virtue ethics: it shows a 
way to incorporate rule-conformity without giving up the central virtue ethical 
commitment – to account for the standard of morality in terms of the inner state of the 
agent. Giving due attention to established norms, virtue ethics would be more capable 
of guiding actions in practical life. My remarks below will be preliminary, and from 
 
20 This aspect of respect is captured by Liu who observes that by advocating respect, Confucians “remind 
us of the existence of potential sources of values, reasons, or most generally, considerations outside 
ourselves, which we, given our natural tendency of self-importance, tend to neglect, or at any rate fail to 
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now on I discuss from a virtue ethical perspective. That is to say, I presume that 
constructive work in virtue ethics is worth doing without defending the validity and 
merits of virtue ethics against other normative theories.  
To begin with, virtue ethics has been proposed as a radical departure from other 
ethical theories as it argues that character traits, not actions, are the primary object of 
moral evaluation. This approach is accused of being unable to guide actions since it 
replaces all questions of what action one should take with the question of what kind of 
person one should be. To see the problem, let’s look at a standard of right action 
proposed by Rosalind Hursthouse: “an action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent 
would characteristically do in the circumstances” (Hursthouse 1999, 18). This thesis 
looks unproblematic as a theory of right action. If a prosecutor prosecutes a defendant 
out of malice, although he is not virtuous, he does the right thing.21 According to 
Hursthouse’s view, the rightness of his action comes from his doing what a virtuous 
person would characteristically do, but his character is defective because he is not 
motivated in a way in which a virtuous person is characteristically motivated.22  
But it is hard to see how this standard of right action can help a non-virtuous agent 
deliberate what to do. A virtuous person (by definition) reaches the right conclusion, 
spontaneously or after deliberation. Virtues of character and practical wisdom (here 
understood broadly as the capacity to weigh and measure the relevant goods correctly) 
coordinate with each other and lead to a decision attuned to the particular situation. 
Such ability, however, is not available to the not-yet-virtuous mind. Without being 
virtuous or surrounded by virtuous exemplars, one simply does not know what a 
virtuous person would do in her situation. When formulating a theory of right action 
we can refer to what a virtuous person would characteristically do, presuming accounts 
of that are available. But in practical life, when an agent needs to deliberate, she is often 
puzzled, confused, or struggling. Deliberation – what a virtuous person would 
characteristically do when facing a tricky situation – does not lead to the right action 
for a non-virtuous agent. 
To respond to this challenge, Hursthouse argues that ideas of virtues and vices 
generate prescriptions and prohibitions – what she calls “v-rules” – such as “do what 
is honest, charitable, generous” and “do not do what is dishonest, uncharitable, mean” 
(ibid, 36). Her account, however, is not clear about the status of the v-rules and how 
they feature in the practical deliberation of mature moral agents. As Eric Hutton points 
out, she introduces the v-rules mainly as a method of educating children, and does not 
mention them in her key discussion of the virtuous person’s deliberation (Hutton 2015, 
 
21 This example is taken from Sidgwick by Michael Slote (2001). 
22 There are other views on the standard of right action. Slote (2001) argues that a right action is an action 
motivated by virtuous intentions (so the prosecutor in the example above acts wrongly). Svensson (2011) 
argues that virtue ethics should not focus on the right action. Swanton (2001, 2003) develops a view that 
shifts the attention from the inner state of agents to the effects of character traits so as to make room for 
right actions in the concept of virtue. I choose Hursthouse’s formulation because (1) it retains a common-
sensical way to evaluate actions (i.e., the prosecutor acts rightly but for bad reasons), and (2) as an 
account of right action it is formal. Hursthouse launches it together with a eudaimonistic understanding 
of virtue, but the account itself can be used as a standard of right action with the standard of virtue 
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120). Furthermore, the v-rules still look quite general to me. They seem to include rules 
of different kinds. Among them, there are rules whose application is highly flexible and 
a single infringement of which has a relatively small impact on the rightness of an 
action and the goodness of an agent: to be a generous person I should do what is 
generous, like giving five dollars to the soup kitchen. But if I do not, I am not doing 
anything wrong and may still remain an overall generous person if I am willing to help 
others often enough. In some other cases, however, rule-following has a greater sway 
on our moral evaluation. Think of a bookkeeper who presses hard questions to the 
manager to examine the company’s financial statements. Even when behaving with all 
due respect, she may look uncharitable, demanding, and obnoxiously detail-oriented. 
But she is not; instead, she is careful, upright, and honest as a bookkeeper fulfilling the 
requirements of her profession. Rules in such cases count more than rules in the 
generosity case. By giving them due weight, we offer reliable practical suggestions to 
morally mediocre people in spheres of life where rule-abidingness is the primary right-
making feature of an action.  
Appealing to rules looks a dangerous move for virtue ethics. The gist of virtue 
ethics is to account for moral values in terms of virtues independently from other 
measurements of value (rule-conformity or utility for instance). To recommend people 
to rely on rules instead of moral exemplars looks like reducing virtue to rule-conformity, 
which reminds us of the lamentable image of a bureaucrat heartlessly following rules. 
I think such difficulty arises because when illustrating their theory, virtue ethicists tend 
to focus on virtues which are basically modes of feeling plus some discretion of 
practical wisdom (e.g., benevolence, generosity, courage).23 When accounting for right 
actions, they tend to appeal to the same set of virtues and let the rarely possessed 
practical wisdom do most of the deliberative work. If a different set of virtues, virtues 
that have rule-conformity as a component, are at their disposal, it would be easier for 
them to recommend the agent to figure out and abide by established rules where they 
are available without giving up the virtue ethical commitment. 24  The practical 
recommendation, ultimately speaking, is still to do what a virtuous person would 
characteristically do, but the virtues involved here require the agent to follow the 
pertinent rules.25  
 
23 Hursthouse explicitly refuses to discuss justice and rights because in her eyes those vague concepts 
are less helpful than concrete virtues (1999, 6). To me, this is an unfortunate move where she misses the 
opportunity to discuss a set of most action-guiding virtues. Putting aside rights, justice as a virtue has 
been elaborated by generations of thinkers from Aristotle. If it looks vague, it is precisely because it 
presumes a social, legal, and political framework as a general scheme of action to which Hursthouse’s 
version of virtue ethics does not pay much attention. 
24 In extreme situations, rules should be overridden, but only a fully virtuous person has the required 
wisdom to decide correctly when to break rules. Here we are talking about non-virtuous people who do 
not possess practical wisdom of that level. Furthermore, practically speaking, the more prevalent 
problem in our moral behavior is not that we stick to rules too rigidly but that we are tempted to break 
rules when we should follow them.   
25 This is to say that by highlighting the merits of the Meng Zi-inspired rule-related virtues I am not 
providing an alternative to Hursthouse’s standard. I am emphasizing the significant role played by social 
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The Mengzian account of yi presents a promising way to characterize that set of 
virtues – what I call rule-related virtues. The two-faceted structure of Mengzian yi 
strikes a delicate balance between the emphasis on the inner state of the agent and the 
attention paid to the schemes of action determined by institutions and conventions. Its 
rule-related aspect stresses the significance of social norms in guiding behaviors. Its 
dispositional aspect maintains the priority of the inner state of the agent by insisting 
that to qualify as yi, an action should be an expression of one’s respectful feelings and 
the sensitivity of the demands of others. Many rules that Meng Zi takes for granted do 
not apply to other societies. But the structure of yi can be used to characterize rule-
related virtues in a modern society such as justice, accountability (in team or 
organizations with regulatory frameworks), loyalty (to business partners), courtesy, etc. 
In this kind of virtue, the salient norms play the major right-making role in actions. For 
example, loyalty to business partners involves a certain amount of commitment to 
individuals just like loyalty in interpersonal relationships, but it has more to do with 
norms in the business in question such as information transparency, technology sharing, 
the adoption of protectionist strategies against rivals. Equipped with thick descriptions 
of rule-related virtues, virtue ethics is more ready to guide actions for non-virtuous 
agents: they (in fact, we) are recommended to follow the established rules where they 





I am grateful to Michael Ing, Wenqing Zhao, and two anonymous reviewers for 
comments that have helped improve this paper. I have also benefited from the 
stimulating comments of the participants in the 13th Midwest Conference of Chinese 






  Another promising virtue ethical account of right action is from Christian Swanton. According to her 
target-centered theory, “an action is virtuous in respect V if and only if it hits the target of virtue V,” and 
“an action is right if and only if it is overall virtuous” (Swanton 2003, 228). Much could be said about 
this account, for the sake of space, I confine my discussion to the following point: This account would 
work if the targets of virtues could be specified, but I doubt if Swanton’s theory of virtue has enough 
resources to do so. The specification of the targets of virtues eventually needs to appeal to the concept 
of virtue, which in Swanton’s theory is “a good quality of character …to respond to, or acknowledge, 
items within its field in an excellent or good enough way” (ibid, 19, italics added). But what counts as 
“excellent or good enough”? Is the hatred of humanity strong enough to motivate the prosecutor to 
prosecute the defendant but not strong enough to murder him good enough? How about certain 
obsessive-compulsive disorder that can do the same motivating work? I suspect that to answer such a 
question, we are led to the idea of flourishing that Swanton wants to do away with. I owe my thanks to 
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